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ABSTRACT
While most of its advocates justify the right to a basic income because it 
promotes individual freedom, autonomy and human development, an 
alternative line of argumentation insists that a universal basic income is a 
core component of a well-functioning democratic society. In this article I 
examine the democratic case for a basic income by engaging with the work 
of Carole Pateman and Michael Goodhart. More concretely, I argue that 
although their proposals offer interesting insights, they ultimately fail to 
properly justify the importance of a basic income on democratic grounds. 
I develop an alternative argument based on the right to political 
participation and explain why a universal basic income scheme may 
promote such right.
Keywords: democracy, political participation, material preconditions, 
social rights, income security, basic income.
1. INTRODUCTION
The right to income security poses something of a conundrum. While it is 
universally accepted that income is very important for the lives of human 
beings, the main international human rights treaties do not explicitly 
recognize a right to income security. Neither the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights nor the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights directly proclaim a right to income security. However, they 
appear to do so indirectly through the right to social security, the right to 
1  Previous versions of the paper were presented at the 8th Summer-School in 
Political Philosophy & Public Policy (University of Minho), the 17th BIEN Congress in Lisbon, 
the Seminario Austral de la Universidad Austral de Chile, and the 2nd International 
Conference of the UK-Latin America Network for Political Philosophy (UKLAPPN) in Mexico 
City. I am grateful to the audiences at these events and to Jurgen De Wispelaere, Felicitas 
Holzer, Julio Montero and two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments 
and suggestions.
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an adequate standard of living and the right to work.2
Income security can be established in various ways (De Wispelaere and 
Morales 2016). The most common view links income to a wage obtained 
from work, social security payments or other state benefits, often subject 
to certain eligibility criteria and past contribution. In recent years, however, 
the proposal to grant each individual citizen a regular cash payment, 
without insisting on a means test or work requirements, has become 
popular in both academic and public policy debates (Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017). The advocates of “basic income” – as the proposal is 
most commonly known – argue that granting each citizen or long-term 
resident an unconditional cash payment is the most effective way to ensure 
income security for all.
Unsurprisingly, this proposal is regarded as deeply controversial and 
there intense debate about its normative justification is ongoing. The most 
influential view tries to ground the right to basic income on the ideal of 
individual freedom. In this vein, Philippe Van Parijs – one of the pioneers 
in the basic income debate – famously sustained that basic income is a 
condition for securing real freedom, understood as the freedom to do 
whatever one might want to do (Van Parijs 1995; also Van Parijs and 
Vanderborght 2017). While freedom-based justifications have dominated 
the debate for years, some authors have emphasized the limitations of this 
approach. Such dissenters do not necessarily object to basic income as 
such; they merely reject the freedom-based justification because they 
think it fails to take into account some key structural features of 
contemporary societies.3 One such view proposes that, instead of freedom, 
we focus on democracy as the political value that could justify an 
unconditional basic income (Pateman 2002, 2003, 2004; Goodhart 2007, 
2008; Van Damme, 2017).
In this article I explore the relationship between basic income and 
democracy. I start my analysis by focusing on the critique of Carole 
Pateman and Michael Goodhart against freedom-based justifications and 
2  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognizes the right to social 
security (art. 22), the right to work (art. 23), and the right to a standard of living (art. 25). The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) establishes the 
right to work (art. 7), the right to social security (art. 9), and the right to a minimum standard 
of living (art. 11).
3  Although some have argued against basic income on precisely such grounds. See, for 
instance, Gourevitch (2016).
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their attempt at grounding a democratic case for basic income.4 The 
writings of Pateman and Goodhart offer many interesting insights but in 
my view end up conflating a number of different democratic arguments. A 
first task of this article is to disentangle the strands of their argumentative 
web and separate out what I believe are importantly different mechanisms 
through which basic income could have a democratic impact. Upon 
reflection, it turns out not all of these different pathways to a democratic 
justification of basic income are convincing. I offer a two-fold critique of 
Pateman and Goodhart by first suggesting that both authors are 
unnecessarily wedded to an over-expansive ideal of democracy and, 
secondly, arguing that a basic income in many cases would fail to deliver 
on the democratic outcome they anticipate. The final section of this article 
constructs what I believe to be a more plausible democratic case for an 
unconditional basic income. Adapting a line of argument already found in 
Pateman and building on my earlier work on the democratic justification 
for social rights (Morales 2016), I examine the extent to which basic income 
constitutes a material precondition for the effective political participation 
of all citizens.
2. BASIC INCOME: FROM INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM TO 
DEMOCRACY?
A basic income is usually defined as an individual entitlement to receive a 
regular payment, independent of other sources of income, employment or 
willingness to work, or living situation (see Van Parijs and Vanderborght 
2017: 5). It is very tempting to articulate the main value of such a basic 
income in terms of expanding a person’s individual freedom as advocated 
most forcefully by Philippe Van Parijs (Van Parijs 1995). Of course, some 
authors reject Van Parijs’ particular conception of freedom; instead, they 
value basic income because it promotes Republican freedom (Pettit 2012b; 
Taylor 2017), Rawlsian political liberalism (Birnbaum 2012), or 
“Independentarian” status freedom (Widerquist 2013). However, all these 
views share a crucial feature: they ground basic income on a certain 
account of individual freedom.
Carole Pateman – a leading democratic theorist – embraces the idea of 
an unconditional basic income, but firmly objects to the dominant 
4  One restriction of this article is that I deliberately focus on the democratic case for 
basic income within a single state. In contrast to Goodhart (2007) I remain agnostic on the 
need to establish a global basic income or the role of basic income within single polities as a 
mechanism to further global democracy. The reason for this restricted focus is my emphasis on 
the role of democratic participation in the political system as typically represented in electoral 
democracies. 
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freedom-based justification (Pateman 2003; 2004).5 Her main concern is 
that because this justification is entirely focused on social justice, liberal 
autonomy and individual freedom, it overlooks the impact a basic income 
may have on fundamental democratic values: 
“Little attention has been paid in recent academic debates to the 
democratic significance of […] a basic income. Participants have tended 
to focus on such questions as social justice, relief of poverty, equality of 
opportunity, or promotion of flexible labor markets, rather than 
democracy” (Pateman 2004: 91).
At the core of a democratic society, Pateman holds, lies the idea that “all 
citizens, women and men alike, have full standing and enjoy democratic 
rights and individual freedom” (Pateman 2003: 130). However, the 
reference to individual freedom should not be misinterpreted; it refers to 
self-government or autonomy and explicitly denotes “a political form of 
freedom in contrast to an economic form of freedom as individual 
opportunity” (Pateman 2003: 132). Pateman insists that political freedom 
must be prioritized: while individual opportunity has an important place 
within a democratic society, it is nevertheless “insufficient for 
democratization, the political process through which all citizens obtain 
full standing, and become first-class democratic citizens” (Pateman 2003: 
132, added emphasis). By focusing on self-government and political 
freedom and its capacity to bring about the “necessary social and political 
change to create a robust democracy for all citizens” (Pateman 2003: 136), 
Pateman moves the justificatory goal posts away from excessively 
individualist approaches and towards a more structural perspective. In 
fact, her decisive objection against freedom-based justifications insists 
that “individual self-government depends not only on the opportunities 
available but also on the form of authority structure within which 
individuals interact with one another in their daily lives” (Pateman 2004: 
91).
How does basic income feature within this democratic theory? I believe 
Pateman provides a patchwork of distinct arguments to answer this 
question. In the remainder of this section I briefly distinguish four of them.
First, Pateman highlights the democratic significance of a universal 
basic income by analogy to the historical and institutional role played by 
universal suffrage. Suggesting that basic income and the right to vote are 
comparable, she writes “a basic income should be seen as a fundamental 
5  At the time, Pateman’s focus was primarily on Van Parijs (1995) and the debate his 
work inspired in political philosophy. Pateman’s critique thus predates the “new wave” of 
freedom-based justifications of basic income, such as Pettit (2012b) or Widerquist (2013).
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or democratic right, like universal suffrage” (Pateman 2003: 131). Universal 
suffrage means that every member of a polity is entitled to participate in 
the electoral process, perhaps subject to certain minimal qualifications, 
such as age or residence. The key aspect here is that any barriers that make 
it harder for citizens to demonstrate their qualification to vote – e.g., 
cumbersome voting registration laws – are deemed undemocratic. Similarly, 
Pateman sustains that all citizens must be entitled to a basic income 
because they are adult members of the polity (Pateman 2003: 146).6 The 
right to basic income and the right to vote are analogous in the sense that 
both are entitlements that every citizen must enjoy as such. When their 
enjoyment is subject to further conditions they turn into a privilege rather 
than a right (Pateman 2003: 146; 2004: 102). In Pateman’s view, just like 
adding strict voting registration requirements frustrates access to voting, 
adding work requirements or means testing hampers access to the basic 
income citizens are entitled to.
Second, Pateman suggests that a basic income is necessary because it 
“provides the lifelong security that helps safeguard other rights” (Pateman 
2004: 94). Michael Goodhart has defended this view in more detail. His 
starting point is a justification of social and economic rights – including a 
right to guaranteed subsistence – as essential to secure emancipation and 
the enjoyment of other basic rights (Goodhart 2007: 94, 2008). He maintains 
that the fundamental right to guaranteed subsistence requires the social 
provision of a basic income (Goodhart 2007: 106) and insists that such 
income is an integral part of a democratic perspective because “its primary 
justification is its role in achieving and securing emancipation for all 
members of society” (Goodhart 2007: 107). In Goodhart’s view, basic 
income therefore is a desirable scheme because it “satisfies the fundamental 
economic right to a guaranteed subsistence that democracy demands” 
(Goodhart 2007: 109).
Third, Pateman insists that democratic citizenship requires equal 
social standing, understood as a relational notion that captures “the form 
of authority structure within which individuals interact with one another 
in their daily lives” (Pateman 2004: 91). Democratic standing informs both 
how individuals perceive themselves in relation to others and how they 
perceive others. In this respect, Pateman (2004: 94) finds inspiration in the 
writings of sociologist T.H. Marshall (1950), who divides citizenship into 
three different components – civil rights, political rights and social rights 
– and maintains that social citizenship involves an equality of status which 
requires “a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a 
6  In many proposals children and adults are covered by slightly different schemes (Van 
Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).
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civilization which is a common possession” (Marshall 1950: 40-41). Basic 
income presents an appealing way to guarantee equally social standing: 
unconditionally securing a basic income to everyone avoids a person who 
would otherwise be subject to a controlling sanctioning welfare regime to 
be treated as “second-class citizens”. 
In a similar vein, Pateman argues that a universal basic income is 
valuable because it helps “to remove the temptation for some citizens to 
see others as less worthy of respect, and so as lesser citizens, because of 
their lack of economic resources” (Pateman 2003: 146). Pateman famously 
extends this idea of democratic citizenship to emphasize its potential in 
advancing the freedom and full social standing of women (Pateman 2004: 
90). This implies revisiting the social institutions of family, marriage and 
employment, and the extent to which these traditionally frustrated “the 
standing of wives as citizens” (Pateman 2004: 98). Critically, a basic income 
“is a crucial part of any strategy for democratic social change” by virtue of 
its capacity to “break the long-standing link between income and 
employment and end the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of 
marriage, employment, and citizenship” (Pateman 2004: 90). In other 
words, for Pateman, basic income plays an important democratic role by 
promoting full social standing of citizens in general, and women in 
particular, in the different spheres of life.
Fourth, Pateman argues for the democratic potential of a universal 
basic income by reference to an important opportunity it creates, namely 
the freedom not to be employed (Pateman 2004: 92). The reason why basic 
income has a significant democratic potential is that it improves the 
capacity of individuals “to refuse to enter or to leave relationships that 
violate individual self-government or that involve unsafe, unhealthy, or 
demeaning conditions” (Pateman 2004: 96). Furthermore, basic income 
also promotes citizens’ participation in collective self-government by 
opening up “opportunities for citizens to develop their political capacities 
and skills” and ensuring “that participation in social and political life 
would not require heroic efforts on the part of any citizens” (Pateman 2004: 
96).7 The focus on increased opportunities allows Pateman to explicitly 
link basic income with the ideal of democratization: 
“by opening up this range of opportunities and uncoupling income and 
standard of life from employment, a basic income has the potential 
both to encourage critical reassessment of the mutually reinforcing 
structures of marriage, employment, and citizenship and to open the 
7  Pateman (2004: 97) writes: “a basic income would allow individuals at any time to do 
voluntary or political work, for example, to learn to surf, to write or paint, to devote themselves 
to family life, or to have a quiet period of self-reassessment or contemplation.”
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possibility that these institutions could be remade in a new, more 
democratic form” (Pateman 2004: 97).
In sum, the democratic case for basic income, as outlined in the writings 
of Carole Pateman (2003, 2004) and Michael Goodhart (2007, 2008) can be 
understood as the mutually reinforcing combination of four distinct 
arguments. Together these paint a picture by which an unconditional basic 
income represents the economic analogy of universal suffrage which, by 
securing the equal enjoyment of fundamental human rights, promotes the 
full social standing and equal range of political and social opportunities for 
all citizens. 
3.  DEMOCRACY AND BASIC INCOME: A CRITICAL 
ASSESSMENT
Pateman and Goodhart justify basic income from a democratic perspective 
by assuming a substantive conception of democracy. However, substantive 
conceptions of democracy often fail to appreciate “value pluralism by 
neglecting the constitutive role of democratic decision-making processes 
for groups of individual agents who try to determine how they should act 
together” (Peter 2009: 2-3). A set of valuable outcomes is posited in advance 
and constrains the decision-making process (e.g., Goodhart 2008: 150), 
neglecting other alternative goals that citizens may reasonably want to 
advance. As Waldron (1999) has forcefully pointed out, this view fails to 
take deep political and moral disagreement seriously. Furthermore, 
substantive conceptions of democracy also blur the lines between 
democracy and social justice, failing to give proper due to democratic 
legitimacy as a distinct political value (Pettit 2012a: 59; Morales 2015).
Michael Goodhart insists that because substantive conceptions of 
democracy highlight the democratic importance of human rights, they 
contribute to the revival of “democracy itself, which in its atrophied 
electoral and procedural forms can seem like a fairly moribund and 
uninspiring ideal” (Goodhart 2007: 98). But in order to avoid the kind of 
“atrophied” democracy represented by procedural models of aggregative 
democracy that give primacy to the formal right to vote and Schumpeterian 
elite competition, it is not necessary to turn democracy into a substantive 
conception of social justice with predetermined social outcomes. As Phillip 
Pettit explains:
“Normative thinking about legal, political, and social institutions has 
been dominated over the past quarter century or more by the ideal of 
justice, in particular social or distributive justice. This focus on justice 
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is unfortunate, because it has suggested that there is only one basic 
ideal that we need to think about in our normative projects. It is 
unfortunate, in particular, because it puts out of the picture the very 
different sort of ideal to which I give the name of legitimacy —
specifically, political legitimacy” (Pettit 2012a: 59).
Michael Goodhart, for instance, clearly adopts such an unfortunate 
position when he suggests that democracy is only instrumentally justified 
as a means to achieving emancipation through the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights (Goodhart 2007: 103; 2008: 150). In the next section I 
propose an alternative democratic model centered on political participation 
that avoids atrophied proceduralism without collapsing political 
legitimacy into social justice.
The Pateman-Goodhart approach to democratization is also problematic 
because they explicitly extend democracy to the family, the workplace and 
the economy (Pateman 2003, 2004). Goodhart holds that “certain 
institutions are more democratic than others, precisely because they are 
instrumental in securing fundamental human rights”; yet this also implies 
that “many rights can be secured differently in different contexts” 
(Goodhart 2008: 150). Unfortunately, this view overlooks that democracy 
is mainly a framework for collective decision making within a political 
system: its fundamental aim is to ensure that collective decisions are 
legitimate (Peter 2009).
These theoretical difficulties pose a practical and strategic problem: 
the sort of basic income scheme required to satisfy the goals that Pateman 
and Goodhart have in mind may be too radical or too demanding under 
present-day socio-economic conditions. The more moderate basic income 
schemes currently under consideration around the world are not likely to 
have the democratic impact Pateman and Goodhart are hoping for. To 
illustrate this problem, I re-examine the four arguments outlined in the 
previous section.
To begin with, the analogy between a universal right to vote and a 
universal right to basic income has some initial plausibility.8 However, 
these rights differ in important aspects. The right to vote is often explained 
through the egalitarian formula “one person, one vote”. Similarly, basic 
income may also be articulated through the formula “one person, one 
basic income”. But is there any deeper reason to accept the analogy 
between both rights? Pateman observes that “universal suffrage is the 
8  Pateman, along with many others, views basic income as a right but see the 
discussion of why conceiving basic income as a right is problematic in De Wispelaere and 
Morales (2016).
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emblem of equal citizenship”, which is further explained by reference to 
“an orderly change of government through free and fair elections” 
(Pateman 2004: 94). It is generally accepted that a person cannot be a 
citizen without the right to vote (King and Waldron 1988). Along similar 
lines, Pateman tries to argue that “a basic income is the emblem of full 
citizenship”, because “basic income as a democratic right is necessary for 
individual freedom as self-government” (Pateman 2004: 94-95). However, 
it is dubious that granting people a modest basic income will suffice to 
ensure the kind of equal citizenship Pateman proposes. Even though basic 
income offers a floor (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017), it may fail to 
block the vast differentials in income and wealth – and, therefore, of power 
– that characterize contemporary societies (Casassas and De Wispelaere 
2016).
Second, Pateman and especially Goodhart maintain that basic income 
is meant to help to secure the equal enjoyment of universal human rights 
across different social spheres, including the family, employment and 
citizenship. Through the secure enjoyment of human rights, basic income 
helps to change the structure of oppressive institutions. Yet the kind of 
basic income that could secure the enjoyment of fundamental rights – “the 
minimum necessary to secure rights and emancipation” (Goodhart 2007: 
105) – would most likely be unfeasible under current conditions.9 However, 
the tenet that a basic income may promote the emancipation of women 
within the family is subject to considerable debate (e.g., Robeyns 2001; 
Zelleke 2011). Some Feminist authors argue that a basic income may end 
up reinforcing traditional gender roles as it may cause women to 
disproportionately exit the labor market (Robeyns 2001: 100-102).10 
Similarly, the view that basic income will emancipate workers has also 
been challenged (Gourevitch 2016; Birnbaum and De Wispelaere 2016). 
The argument advanced by Pateman and Goodhart relies on basic income 
improving the bargaining position of workers vis-a-vis employers by 
granting workers an exit option. But on realistic assumptions of how 
9  Additionally, Goodhart’s democratic argument appears to be circular. If all 
fundamental basic rights must be achieved in order to obtain emancipation, and if basic 
income’s failure to protect one right means no single right is protected (because of their 
interdependence), then the securement of other fundamental rights never could be justified 
if not by a democratic decision-making process where the fundamental basic right to 
participation is secured. But for Goodhart the right to participation can be left aside if there 
is another political organization that can guarantee other rights, such as an absolutist 
government, destroying the very notion of interdependent fundamental rights.
10  Robeyns concludes that basic income does not reduce gender injustice, and it is 
necessary for it to be “supplemented with other social policy measures that liberate women”, 
including “the transformation of certain cultural and social patterns, like gender roles and 
gender hierarchies, which are now constraining individuals in their freedom” (Robeyns 
2001: 103).
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contemporary labor markets work, “an exit strategy might end up 
worsening rather than strengthening the opportunity set and bargaining 
position of the most vulnerable workers” (Birnbaum and De Wispelaere 
2016: 61).
A democratic case for basic income that relies on basic income being 
able to substantially secure a set of fundamental rights in order to promote 
genuine emancipation and democratization appears too tall an order for a 
realistic basic income scheme to satisfy. This puts Pateman and Goodhart 
at risk of being caught between the rock of downgrading the fulfillment of 
fundamental rights and the hard place of insisting on an utterly impractical 
basic income ideal.11
Third, as I have already mentioned, Pateman views democratic 
citizenship as a form of social standing. Building on the work of T.H. 
Marshall allows her to extend citizenship into the economic sphere by 
arguing that social and economic rights play a constitutive role in the 
equal standing of citizens. Being denied this equal standing amounts to a 
person being relegated to second-class citizenship or even denizenship 
(Standing 2012). Importantly, equal social standing requires independence 
and freedom from oppression and domination within the prevailing 
institutions of marriage, family, and employment. Once more, this idea is 
problematic because the sort of basic income policy that would promote 
such genuine independence would be unfeasible under current conditions. 
Without a clear sense of what level of basic income would be deemed 
sufficient to ensure the required independence it is difficult to assess 
whether a feasible basic income scheme contributes to democratization in 
the desired manner.
Finally, Pateman insists that basic income promotes a bundle of social 
and political opportunities, including those that follow from the freedom 
not to be employed. This includes opportunities to support individuals’ 
political participation in the decision making-process, opportunities for 
citizens to develop their political capacities and skills, and opportunities 
to do political work. These are all very relevant and important opportunities 
that directly connect basic income with democracy. However, two 
problems remain. On the one hand, Pateman offers no clear account of 
how precisely a basic income would improve political participation or 
democratic skills. What social or institutional levers does basic income 
11  Goodhart appears to bite the bullet when proposing basic income not as a welfare 
or poverty reduction program, but rather as a democratic entitlement that “costs more and 
delivers more; the value of what it delivers is ultimately a measure of our political 
commitments” (Goodhart 2008: 155). Of course this does not make basic income politically 
feasible.
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pull and how does this impact on democratic opportunities? On the other 
hand, for Pateman basic income appears to impact primarily by granting 
workers the opportunity to refuse employment. As mentioned before, 
recent research casts doubt on whether basic income is able to achieve 
such a robust “right to exit” or even have any meaningful impact on the 
democratic nature of employment relations (Birnbaum and De Wispelaere 
2016). But even if that were the case, there is something fundamentally 
flawed about a view that depends on freedom from employment as a 
mediating mechanism to make a democratic argument stick. What about 
the democratic impact of basic income on workers’ political opportunities? 
If indeed freedom from work was the main pathway through which basic 
income secures democratic values and objectives, this would surely reduce 
its scope and democratic impact. 
When considered together, these objections suggest that in spite of its 
initial plausibility, the freedom to exit the labor market may make no real 
contribution to individual self-government. What we need is an argument 
that explains why a basic income may improve individuals’ opportunities 
to participate in the political process that does not exclusively depend on 
the freedom to exit employment. I provide such argument in the next 
section.
4. THE DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENT FOR BASIC INCOME 
REVISITED
In this final section I offer a democratic argument for basic income that 
builds on the work of Pateman but avoids the pitfalls I have discussed 
previously. Collective decisions are considered legitimate if they result 
from a decision-making process that satisfies the necessary formal and 
material conditions that secure the participation of all citizens (Peter 2009: 
4). On this view, political participation is the foundation of legitimate 
political authority because it respects the equal moral agency of each 
citizen. Political citizenship essentially refers to the right to political 
participation in the decision-making processes of the polity (Waldron 1999). 
This right must be universally realized: no citizen should be excluded 
either on formal or material grounds (Morales 2015, 2017). Formal exclusion 
occurs when institutional rules prevent some citizens from exercising 
their right to political participation. Material exclusion takes place when 
citizens fail to participate because they lack certain material resources 
even if no formal rule prevents them from doing so. In liberal democratic 
theory, the right to political participation is typically interpreted in formal 
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terms. However, the legal recognition of a formal right to political 
participation is insufficient to guarantee the effective political participation 
of all. This raises a fundamental question: why must a citizen accept the 
authority of a political decision when she is materially unable to exercise 
her formal right to participate? Why should citizens accept political 
authority in cases where they are formally included but practically 
excluded from participation in the decision-making process? Real life 
examples of such a disjunction between formal and material right to 
political participation are plentiful, especially regarding the right to vote. 
Some political systems impose burdensome requirements of voter 
registration, which effectively disenfranchise otherwise eligible voters. 
Other systems may facilitate registration but many voters are unable to 
reach the polling booth because of a lack of transport or inability to take 
time off work. A formal interpretation of the right to vote – understood as a 
subset of the broader right to political participation – appears too weak to 
establish the legitimacy of a political system. 
The tenet that democratic decisions are legitimate because every citizen 
has an effective opportunity to participate in the decision making process 
does not imply that individuals must be treated equally in all domains of 
life – be it the family, the workplace, or the marketplace. Although all 
domains of life can be considered as political – as Feminists such as 
Pateman have rightly argued – there are relevant differences between the 
political domain and other social spheres. Several arguments may justify a 
more extensive or generous conception of equality in the social and 
economic realm; yet this is fully compatible with thinking that the political 
system is where legitimate processes of collective decision-making take 
place under conditions that must ensure the political participation of all 
citizens. Importantly, this view implies no commitment to the sort of 
atrophied electoral proceduralism that Pateman and Goodhart have 
criticized. 
Legitimate political participation is not restricted to voting in a formal 
election, campaigning for a candidate, or having the opportunity to run for 
public office, as Schumpeterians maintain. The concept of political 
participation must be broadened to include a host of other political acts 
provided they are “structurally embedded in the political system” 
(Cicatiello, Ercolano and Gaeta 2015: 448-449). Thus, the actions of public 
interest groups, civil organizations or social movements aimed at lobbying 
political decision-makers are rightly regarded as instances of political 
participation. Even acts of civil disobedience and protest at the margins of 
the social order – such as boycotts or the occupation of public offices – can 
be considered forms of political participation, for they too are aimed at 
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directly or indirectly influencing decision-makers.12 What unites this wide 
range of political activities is that they all contribute to the democratic 
process “by which citizens can communicate information about their 
interests, preferences and needs to the government” (Bovens and Wille 
2010: 395). Adopting a broad view of political participation that includes 
both “conventional” and “unconventional” forms of political action 
(Cicatiello, Ercolano and Gaeta 2015) situates my account of political 
democracy between advocates of a Schumpeterian electoral democracy 
and the more expansive emancipatory democratic model advocated by 
Pateman and Goodhart.
The intermediate model I propose implies that a genuine democracy 
must ensure that citizens have access to the full range of political 
participation activities, not merely a right to vote or stand in an election. 
Contestatory measures such as access to courts to challenge legislation or 
to engage in social protest are equally important (Pettit 2012b). That said, 
since most citizens engage in unconventional participation when they feel 
excluded from conventional forms of participation – e.g., people protest 
when they feel they have no real voice in an election – we should focus on 
conventional political participation in the first instance. Securing access 
to unconventional political participation is a second-best solution to a 
political system that has failed to include all citizens in conventional 
politics. With these building blocks in place, let us now examine the role of 
an unconditional basic income.
The democratic case for basic income depends on establishing a firm 
link between basic income and its expected impact on political 
participation. The idea that citizens need a guaranteed income to 
effectively participate in the legitimate democratic process is hardly a 
novel thought:
“Almost all of the great theorists of citizenship [...] have believed that in 
order to be a citizen of a polis, in order to be able to participate fully in 
public life, one needed to be in a certain socio-economic position. [...] 
People, it was said, could not act as citizens at all, or could not be 
expected to act well in the political sphere and to make adequate 
decisions, unless some attention was paid to matters of their wealth, 
their well-being and their social and economic status” (King and 
Waldron 1988: 425-426).
Contemporary democratic societies do not restrict the formal political 
12  Political participation at the margin of the social order may skirt what is deemed 
legal at any given time. The legality of protest and other unconventional political acts is a 
complicated matter.
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participation of poor or economically disadvantaged people any longer: 
political rights are accorded to all citizens equally and no one can be 
politically excluded on the basis of social and economic status. Nevertheless, 
lack of money or income inequality continue to affect political participation 
even today.
Should income be regarded as a material precondition for political 
participation? The role of money in politics is indisputable: “money is an 
important political resource for any group, but it takes special significance 
for people who live at or near poverty levels” (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995: 288-303). A recent study confirms this view: “[t]he higher (lower) 
individual income is, the higher (lower) individual engagement in 
conventional and unconventional political activities is” (Cicatiello, 
Ercolano and Gaeta 2015: 451). In fact, “income may be considered the 
most important individual-level determinant of political participation; all 
political activities are costly because resources (time, money, skills) must 
be invested in order to carry them out” (Cicatiello, Ercolano and Gaeta 
2015: 450). Of course, the relevance of money should not lead us to 
underestimate other important structural obstacles to political 
participation.13 A universal basic income may be unable to eradicate many 
structural barriers that continue to exist in contemporary societies – 
including those related to religion, ethnicity, or gender. Basic income is 
only a partial solution to practical disenfranchisement in contemporary 
politics. Still, poverty and income inequality are also important structural 
obstacles that prevent those at the bottom of the income distribution from 
exercising their equal right to political participation. To the extent that 
poverty and income inequality undermine political participation, the 
democratic case for a basic income is a promising avenue to explore.
The main question is why money matters more for the political 
participation of those living at or near poverty, which presumably is where 
we would expect a basic income scheme to have its most pronounced 
effect? In other words, what is the mechanism that allows basic income to 
impact on a citizen’s ability to participate in political life? First, we might 
expect basic income to have a direct effect on the sort of costly actions that 
active citizens must engage in. For instance, basic income may help people 
afford the costs of voting registration or transport to the polling booth. 
Likewise, it may help to finance political campaigns: Obama’s presidential 
campaign was famously funded through numerous small donations from 
poor supporters. In spite of this, we might ask why a basic income is the 
best response to the reduced participation of the poor. Perhaps more 
targeted policies, such as subsidized registration or free public transport 
13  I thank a referee for this journal for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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during the election day, are better. Furthermore, when resources are 
scarce, using money to promote participation involves significant 
opportunity costs for the poor because such money could be invested in 
providing them secure access to nutritious food, housing or medical care. 
Finally, any moderate basic income scheme will most likely not suffice to 
support a number of important instances of political participation, thereby 
failing to fully satisfy the requirements of political inclusion. So it seems 
that when it comes to direct costs, more targeted solutions may perform 
better than a universal basic income.
The democratic value of a basic income is better appreciated when we 
consider the indirect effects that (the lack of) money has on political 
participation. For instance, a basic income may create incentives to 
participate through conventional channels because citizens will most 
probably want to defend a public policy that benefits them (Campbell 
2003). In other words, a basic income might politicize citizens because it 
gives them a stake in society (Dowding, De Wispelaere and White 2003). 
Relatedly, those who cannot “live the lives of a civilized being according to 
the standards prevailing in the society risk marginalization and shame”, 
which translates in political distrust and subsequently in reduced 
participation (Soss 2005: 306, citing Marshall 1964: 72). Unlike highly 
selective and conditional programs, a basic income would avoid negative 
experiences with case workers and other “representatives” of the state, 
therefore boosting political participation (Soss 2005; Bruch, Ferree and 
Soss 2010).14 
In addition, “the daily struggle to make ends meet leaves individuals 
with little time or energy to follow the public debate, participate in political 
organizations, or hold elected representatives accountable” (Soss 2005: 
306). Recent research has even suggested that poverty implies a genuine 
“scarcity mindset” with cognitive bandwidth restricted to survival 
activities (Mani et al. 2013). Finally, political decision-makers respond 
differently to distinct “target populations”, such that “policies for 
disadvantaged groups will isolate or stigmatize their targets, setting them 
apart from the majority as an object of pity or scorn” (Soss 2005: 294). One 
expected effect of the universalism of a basic income policy is that it might 
escape such easy targeting by decision-makers. 
In sum, through a variety of pathways basic income could have indirect 
positive effects on poor citizens’ political participation by freeing up time, 
energy and “cognitive bandwidth”, and by positively affecting their status 
14  However, a recent study of the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil suggests much also 
depends on how selective programs themselves are framed (Hunter and Borges Sugiyama 
2014).
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and beliefs about themselves and others. The democratic hope is that basic 
income can generate a virtuous circle, through which an increased 
participation of the poor will bring about more responsiveness to their 
plights; and this will in turn reinforce participation.
5. CONCLUSION
In this article I have examined the democratic case for basic income. The 
idea that basic income should be justified not by reference to individual 
freedom but because of its impact on democratic citizenship was pioneered 
by Carole Pateman and developed by Michael Goodhart. However, I find 
that their approach fails to establish a robust case for basic income on 
democratic grounds. One major issue is that neither Pateman nor Goodhart 
offer a clear account of the pathways by which a basic income produces 
democratic value. Another major obstacle is that the kind of basic income 
their expansive model of democracy calls for is unfeasible under present 
conditions. I sustain that a more modest model of democracy that 
prioritizes broad and effective political participation in decision-making 
processes, offers a more plausible democratic case for a universal basic 
income. Recent research by political scientists has established a number of 
mechanisms through which low income and poverty negatively impacts 
on political participation. Granting each citizen an unconditional and 
secure basic income is a promising remedy to rectify this problem.
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